Hot take
The Chinese Room argument against computer sentience doesn't sit well with me for many reasons, but first and foremost is the fact that Searle's reply to criticism seems to be "Ah, but if you look at [thing indistinguishable from his original room], you'll find the man doesn't speak Chinese, therefore I am very smart."
Philosophy time!
I really wanna harp on one particular example of this: The water brain. Now, this isn't exactly indistinguishable from the original room, but, hey, Searle insisted on putting the man back into the system, so already we're at a bad start. But, here's the thing. Searle argues basically that since the man providing input to the brain doesn't understand chinese, the brain can't. THIS IS A LOAD OF UTTER RUBBISH.
Philosophy time!
What I do know is Searle needs to actually fucking think about his arguments, because that fucking response was the most foolish, least convincing thing I've ever fucking read. Like, damn, dude.
Philosophy time!
My other big problem is that he comes dangerously close to being a mind-body dualist without actually saying he is one (to my knowledge). Like, if he just came out and said "Yeah, computers can't think because we have some kind of æthereal stuff that actually gives us consciousness," I'd respect him more than I do.
Philosophy time!
The obvious example of this is in the aforementioned water brain. If the water brain is functionally identical in function, # of neurons, etc. to a human brain, why would it not be able to think? After all, it's capable of all the same things the human brain is. To say it can't would be to say there's something beyond the physical that actually gives us a conscious mind. But Searle doesn't say that. Instead he just gives an absurd argument about how the pipes can't think.
Philosophy time!
There's also the case of brain replacement. Suppose we had a computer that simulated a single neuron, and we replaced each neuron in your brain with one of these one at a time. (Oi, get those kink thoughts out of here!) If the brain is purely physical, this shouldn't change anything. If there's a "soul", it would. Searle seems to lie towards the latter, thinking you'd, say, lose your vision at some point, even though the new neurons would wire in with the old ones.
Philosophy time!
But where would that loss of vision come from. If I replaced just my visual cortex with these new neurons, why would "I" lose my vision? After all, these new neurons are firing the exact same signals into the rest of my brain as the old ones. If I replaced my speech centers, why would I not be able to speak? After all, they're still receiving the same signals that my old neurons were.
Philosophy time!
Also, his argument seems a smidge inconsistent given that our hypothetical replacee would lose vision and speech, but not the ability to hear and process language, but the new neurons would have that ability. Like, even if you're a mind-body dualist, how the fuck would this go down? How would the new mind be able to hear but the old not able to see? Feel free to think on that one, but I'm just digressing.
Philosophy time!
Anyways, so, yes. I don't know whether computers can think. I don't even know if other people can think. But I do know that Searle's Chinese room argument is largely a pile of trash. Maybe one day I'll try to properly formalize these arguments so he can throw the same weak ass reply at me as he does everyone else: "BUT THE MAN CAN'T SPEAK CHINESE!"
Philosophy time!
Here's why: THE MAN IS THE WATER BRAIN'S EYES. This argument is the equivalent of saying because eyes don't understand Chinese, neither does the brain of a Chinese speaker and thus the Chinese speaker must not have a mind. The man doesn't factor into whether the brain can think. He's just a source of stimuli for the water brain. Can the water brain think? I dunno. I'm tempted towards yes, since it's a complete replica of a brain, but I dunno.